Re: Slapper questions

In-Reply-To: <3DB85052.7A4F4286@xxxxxxxxxxx>

I've seen a similar incident, very recently (last week infact).  It 
appears that someone has modified slapper to be used in conjunction with 
a root kit (I'm not sure which one, haven't been able to research that 
yet) to gain access to their server.  They then proceeded to use several 
tools to clear the log files (/var/log/messages anyways) and start up 
some ethernet sniffers.  I've included a list of files that I found on 
the system that you may want to look at (though I would personally run 
checks agains all my system binaries as well, I found some that didn't 
match the MD5):

/var/www/.bash_history (this was very interesting to look at)
/etc/security/console.apps (found some new entries here)
/etc/sysconfig/console  (same here)

/usr/bin
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     apache       1250 Oct 16 14:43 clean*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     apache      18827 Oct 16 14:43 slice*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     apache      21850 Oct 16 14:43 stealth*

Those ones were the log cleaner/sniffer...

/usr/local/games
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     apache      18799 Oct 16 14:44 parse*
-rw-r--r--    1 root     apache         37 Oct 17 10:49 pid

I can't remember what those two did, I think they wre part of the sniffer.
Now there was other stuff in there, but they didn't give me enough time 
to do a full analysis, as soon as they found out why their machine was 
running so slow they went to work on repairing it.  I kept as much data 
as I could, and it's available upon request.




>
>It seems unlikely that an automated process was scanning on port 23/tcp
>for anything that would use the SSL libraries which had these problems. 
>As far as I know, no self-spawning trojan was ever created that would
>even check port 22 - only port 443 would be affected at least by the
>slapper worms I know of, since they relied 100% on an SSL-enabled web
>server.  I don't believe they infected via SSH on any port
>automatically, though it could be theoretically possible (the first
>advisory bulletins I saw regarding the SSL problem were for SSH
>actually, the slapper worm was an afterthought that went after web
>servers, not SSH servers).  
>It seems like you've done a lot right, and very little if anything
>wrong, but there may be some more checking left to do.  A good place to
>start is a full audit of anything affecting init (ie /etc/rc?.d,
>/etc/init.d, your init configurations like inittab, etc), a ps listing
>audit, and running some MD5 checksums against your system binaries
>against a clean and 100% secure machine if possible.  An audit on /tmp
>sounds like it wouldn't hurt, either.  :-)
>
>Stephen Smoogen wrote:
>> 
>> Its a bit late in the game, but you may have a backdoor (or various
>> backdoors) running on the system. My advice is to do the following 
(with
>> the assumption you only have 1 machine available to run the website).
>> [Sorry if it is a bit general, but its from a list I hand out to
>> completely new sysadmins working on compromised machines.]
>> 
>> A) Take the system off the network (letting management know why)
>> B) Backup the system to completely to tape in case you need to present 
a
>>    report to law enforcement or management (why I need to be paid
>>    more or sent to that SANS training. :))
>> C) Go over what you need on this machine still (IE what code etc is
>>    running on it for webservices that may need to be audited to see if 
a
>>    back door was planted there.)
>> D) Reinstall the machine from source cdroms and then put all updates 
for
>>    that operating system on the machine.
>> E) If your Linux vendor has an automated system of alerts or updates 
see
>>    if you can sign up for it or get your employeer to pay
>>    for it.
>> F) Reinstall the software that you need for the website to be
>>    operational and test it for working.
>> G) Put the machine back on the network and test functionality again
>> H) Go over all that was discovered and write up a short report for your
>>    CYA file and to hand over to management over what happened, why, and
>>    what needs to be done in the future.
>> 
>> If you have multiple hardware and more than 1 staff you can parallelize
>> portions of C, D, E, and F. H sounds like a nuisance, but it can save
>> your job or worse.
>> 
>> On Wed, 2002-10-23 at 13:42, Griff Palmer wrote:
>> > Hello:
>> >
>> > I'm trying to learn more about how the Apache/mod_ssl worm variants 
operate.
>> >
>> > Last month chkrootkit discovered evidence of the Slapper worm on my 
RedHat
>> > 7.2 server. I found .bugtraq.c in my /tmp directory and eliminated 
it. I
>> > updated my openssl to 0.9.6g-1. I blocked port 443 on my firewall.
>> >
>> > I keep my ftp daemon stopped except for occasional short periods 
when I need
>> > to use it. I've been leaving port 23 open and making my ssh host 
listen on
>> > port 23. (My employer's firewall blocks traffic on port 22, forcing 
me to go
>> > to the port 23 setup.)
>> >
>> > Regular scans with chkrootkit since then have shown no signs of the 
slapper
>> > worm's presence.
>> >
>> > This morning I received an e-mail bounce from cinik_worm@xxxxxxxxx
>> > (apparently Yahoo has disabled that address). A search on cinik led 
me to the
>> > latest CERT bulletin, which showed information about the slapper B 
and C
>> > variants.
>> >
>> > After reading the bulletin I discovered the presence of cinik.c and 
cinik.go
>> > in my /tmp directory, which I eliminated.
>> >
>> > I also discovered an active .bugtraq process on my machine and 
killed it.
>> >
>> > I've blocked UDP packets on ports 1812 and 1813. (Looking at the CERT
>> > bulletin it looks as if I should also block 1978, 2002 and 4156.) 
I've
>> > commented out the listen 443 line in my httpd.conf file.
>> >
>> > At this point I'm confused about the mechanics of the infection 
process and
>> > about what further steps I may need to take to fully eliminate 
infection and
>> > harden my server.
>> >
>> > Is Port 23 an avenue of infection? Does upgrading to openssl-0.9.6g-
1 not
>> > eliminate vulnerability to compromise? Is it possible that I missed 
the
>> > C-variant code when I discovered the .bugtraq code, and that the C 
variant
>> > code has lingered on my machine since then? I'm using chkrootkit-
0.37. Is it
>> > able to detect the B and C variants as well as A variants?
>> >
>> > I've run ps on my machine many times since chkrootkit discovered the 
Slapper
>> > A variant. Those checks showed no presence of the .bugtraq process. 
(I even
>> > downloaded and installed new system binaries in case any of those 
had been
>> > subverted.)
>> >
>> > The .bugtraq process showed up after I upgraded my kernel this 
morning. Is it
>> > possible that my earlier kernel had been compromised and that 
the .bugtraq
>> > process was being hidden?
>> >
>> > Any advice appreciated.
>> >
>> >                                                       Griff Palmer
>> >
>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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>> --
>> Stephen John Smoogen            smoogen@xxxxxxxx
>> Los Alamos National Labrador  CCN-2 B-Schedule  PH:
>> Ta-03 SM-261  MailStop P208 DP 17U  Los Alamos, NM 87545
>> 
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>
>-- 
>/*
> *
> * Matt Harris - Senior UNIX Systems Engineer
> * Smithsonian Institution, OCIO
> *
> */
>
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