On Wed, 2005-04-27 at 22:09 -0400, brett wrote:
httpd_disable_trans active
What? That should have disabled all protection on httpd, i.e. the
transition into httpd_t in the first place. Or did you just make that
change after being unable to get it to work?
httpd_enable_homedirs active
Allows access to user home directories. For better security, disable.
httpd_unified active
This folds together the distinct types of web content; preferable to
disable it if possible.
/home/test/.gnupg
test is a user. Also, i plan on using symmetric encryption so i don't
think it needs the keyring file.
Why isn't it just part of the web tree under /var/www so that you can
prohibit access to user home directories entirely?
Apr 24 22:29:06 razorfold kernel: audit(1114396146.398:0): avc: denied {
execute } for pid=6266 comm=gpg path=/etc/ld.so.cache dev=dm-0
ino=3919093 scontext=user_u:system_r:httpd_sys_script_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:ld_so_cache_t tclass=file
Apr 24 22:29:06 razorfold kernel: audit(1114396146.398:0): avc: denied {
execmod } for pid=6266 comm=gpg path=/usr/bin/gpg dev=dm-0 ino=4972274
scontext=user_u:system_r:httpd_sys_script_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t tclass=file
This is a result of gpg being marked as requiring an executable stack
(and still looks that way in FC4/devel - execstack -q /usr/bin/gpg
reports X - Dan?).
With a newer kernel (>= 2.6.12-rc2, also included in
FC4/devel kernels), you'd at least avoid the noise on ld.so.cache due to
the checkreqprot compatibility support. But you would still need
execmod on the gpg binary; under strict policy, gpg has its own separate
executable type (gpg_exec_t) and domain (gpg_t), so we only need to
allow execmod for that particular case. What's suggested for FC3
targeted policy, Dan?
