Subject: Logic 101 - msg#00068

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Re: Teleological Logic

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o TEL. Note 2 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | Teleological Logic (concl.) | | Representations | | are of three kinds according to their truth or | coincidence with their objects. These are | | 1 'Signs'. Representations by virtue of a convention. | 2 'Symbols'. Representations by virtue of original or acquired nature. | 3 'Copies'. Representations by virtue of a sameness of predicates. | | By a symbol is meant such a representation as is regarded | as a representation in another system of representation. | A word for instance upon being presented to the mind, | immediately calls up a conception of the object | without resembling it and without any reference | to the convention, which has however existed. | Concepts are a species of symbols. | | A symbol is created by a 'logos', equivalent | to another symbol in the system in which it is | regarded as a symbol, and stands for an object. | | A 'Logos' is an embodied form. | | An 'object' is an informed thing. | | The science of the general conditions | in which every symbol is subjected in | so far as it is related | | ( a logos is 'General Grammar' | to < a language is 'General Rhetoric' | ( an Object is 'General Logic'. | | Hence we have | | Science | _________________^_________________ | / \ | Formal Science Semiotic Positive Science | _________________^_________________ | / \ | Science of Copies Symbolistic Science of Signs | _________________^_________________ | / \ | Grammar Rhetoric Logic | | | C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 303-304 | | C.S. Peirce, "Teleological Logic", MS 108 (1865 May 14), pp. 303-304 in: |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866', | Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

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Re: Attribute, Impute, Represent -- Discussion

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o AIR. Discussion Note 15 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA = Jon Awbrey JP = Jim Piat Re: AIR-COM 1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002565.html In: AIR-COM. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2565 Jim, I continue from where I left off ... JP: In my view the critical point (as pertains to the discussion of whether symbols are necessarily iconic in their function) is that according to the above account the ground of the relationship between the object and the representamen in the case of both icons and 'general signs' is an agreement in quality. In the case of icons this agreement is real but in the case of general signs this agreement is attributed. I agree with all Jon says below except in paragraph four (4) I would not have equated 'applies' with 'denotes'. It appears that we need to split another hank of hairs at this point in time, since we 'apparently' need a couple of new terms: (1) for a symbol that does not of necessity involve an icon in any way, shape, or fashion as an adjunct to performing as a symbol, and (2) for a symbol that does not of necessity involve an index in any way, shape, or fashion, as an adjunct to performing as a symbol. I would say that the word "symbol" suffices for both of these, but we 'apparently' need a name for the classes as conceived, however empty these classes may be in actual point of fact. I don't have any alternative names in mind in present but will sleep on it. JP: Also I have a further comment regarding Jon's remarks about the distinction between an attribute and an attributed attribute. I don't get the sense that Peirce is deliberately punning here, at least not in any sort of malicious way, but I do from time to time get the suspicion that our evoluted natural languages have a distinctive malice aforethought weft into their warps. I think it can all be sorted out, howeaver, if not always by trying to fight words with words. For the time being, it helps to realize that phrases like "imputed quality" are really circumlocutions for 3-adic relative terms like "quality imputed to __ by __", and thus that it is a category error, in several senses of the word "category" to put imputed qualities on a par with absolute qualities, acquired natures, and so on. JP: I would suppose that what Jon has is mind is the distinction between a 'real' attribute and one which is ideal or depends upon what someone thinks is an attribute. If a representamen and its object have a real quality in common the representamen is a real icon. Of course you know this, but only if the common quality, of which there might indeed be innumerable possibilities, is the particular common quality in virtue of which the sign is interpreted to be a sign of that object. JP: If a representamen and its object have an attributed quality in common (ie a real qualtity of the icon which is only attributed to the representamen) the representamen is a general sign or symbol. So the ground on which both icons and symbols relate to their objects is the same -- namely a commonality of quality. Not quite. There can be no commonality between the quality and the attributed quality, or at best, nothing more than a "partially nominal commonality", a commonality in name only, and indeed, in only parts of their names. JP: In the case of icons this common quality is real. In the case of symbols this common quality is a real enough quality of the object but is only attributed to the representamen. Attribution is triadic and depends upon an attributant or interpretant. Mere correspondence in fact is dyadic. So, in conclusion, are icons and symbols the same? No. Are icons and symbols similar in that both depend upon correspondence of quality between the object and the representamen? Yes. Can a symbolic representamen also contain traces of an iconic representamen? Yes. Can there be a symbolic representamen that contains no trace of an iconic representamen? Yes. Is such a symbol a pure symbol? I suppose one could say yes and no depending upon what one meant by 'pure symbol'. This seems like a plausible enough reading up to this point, but I still have my worries about a couple of details that only further reading and thinking may help to unravel. JP: But can there be a symbol (however pure) that is not grounded (like an icon) on similarity (real or attributed) between the symbolic representamen and the object? No. Here I have graver doubts. It still seems to me, on the strength of other definitions of the sign relation, that a sign can bear information about an object without the involvement of adjunctive icons or indices of any sort. Jon Awbrey JP: Anyway that's my latest attempt at understanding of both sides of this discussion. For me understanding of both sides necessarily implies reconciliation. Even in diametric opposition their is reconciliation if the relationship between both sides is understood. For me a contradiction is merely a dyadic view of a triadic relationship. There is always room for agreement if the intepretive frame is expanded. And until this frame is expanded to the point of agreement there is something about one or both sides of the argument that one or both sides do not understand about the other. That's my contribution to world peace --- piss off and insult both sides. Just kidding of course. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

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Teleological Logic

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o TEL. Note 1 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | Teleological Logic (MS 108) | | Begun 1865 May 14 | | Chapter 1 | | Definition | | Logic is objective symbolistic. | | Symbolistic is the semiotic of symbols. | | Objective symbolistic is that branch of | symbolistic which considers relations | to objects. | | Semiotic is the science of representations. | | Representation is anything which is or is represented | to stand for another and by which that other may be | stood for by something which may stand for the | representation. | | Thing is that for which a representation stands | prescinded from all that can serve to establish | a relation with any possible relation. | | Form is that respect in which a representation stands for a thing | prescinded from all that can serve as the basis of a representation | and therefore from its connection with the thing. | | Thus Science is divided into | | 1 Positive Science. Or the science of things. | | 2 Semiotic. Or the science of representations. | | 3 Formal Science. Or the science of forms. | | C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 303 | | C.S. Peirce, "Teleological Logic", MS 108 (1865 May 14), pp. 303-304 in: |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Vol. 1, 1857-1866', | Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

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Re: Logic 101

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o LOG. Note 2 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | Logic Chapter 1 (cont.) | | Kant first formed a table of the various logical divisions of judgments, and | then deduced his categories directly from these. For example, corresponding | to a categorical form of judgment is the relation of substance and accident, | and corresponding to the hypothetical form is the relation of cause and effect. | The correspondences between the functions of judgment and the categories are | obvious and certain. So far the method is perfect. Its defect is that it | affords no warrant for the correctness of the preliminary table, and does | not display that direct reference to the unity of consistency which alone | gives validity to the categories. | | Partly in order to remedy this defect, Hegel produced his logic. | He begins at the unity of being and runs through the categories | guided by the homogeneousness of their internal relationships, | and ends with the functions of judgment. He brought to the | task such a surpassing genius for this kind of thought, | that by the result of his labor, this inverted method | must be finally judged. Now his procedure does not | seem to give determinate solutions; but the results | seem to be arbitrary; for whereas he has finally | arrived at the same divisions of the judgment as | were made by Kant and currently received at | Hegel's day, the more recent researches of | logic have essentially modified these and | have shown them to be wrong. | | C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, 351-352 | | C.S. Peirce, "Logic Chapter 1", MS 115 (1866), pp. 351-356 in: |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition', |'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project, | Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o