BMCR 2004.10.12, David Sedley, Plato's Cratylus

David Sedley, Plato's Cratylus.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University
Press, 2003.  Pp. xi, 190.  ISBN 0-521-58492-2.  $60.00.

Reviewed by Zina Giannopoulou, 
Classics and Philosophy, University of Redlands 
(zina_giannopoulou@xxxxxxxxxxxx)
Word count:  1321 words
-------------------------------

Cratylus is Plato's comprehensive discussion of 'the correctness of
names,' and one of his most elusive dialogues. In the last decade or so
a number of books and articles have attempted to cast valuable light
both on the main philosophic purport of the dialogue and on the ways in
which it anticipates Plato's more sophisticated linguistic concerns in
Sophist.[[1]] Sedley's book, which inaugurates the new Cambridge
University Press series 'Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato,'
is a philosophically rigorous and skillful interpretation of the
dialogue that, while it poses old and quite familiar questions, manages
to deal with them in a refreshingly novel manner. This is especially
true of the first two chapters, which examine various issues pertaining
to author and text as well as the nature and value of etymology, and to
which I shall devote the bulk of my review. Sedley's exposition in
chapters three to seven follows the order of the Platonic text, from
Hermogenes' conventionalist position, through various aspects of
Cratylan nominalism (etymologies, theory of linguistic imitation), to
the need for a degree of conventionalism and for the study of the
things themselves. The bibliography, though not exhaustive, lists all
major studies of the dialogue while an index locorum and a general
index are carefully assembled reference tools.

Sedley's overall thesis is that the fictional Cratylus depicts a
dialectical confrontation between Cratylus, who, on Aristotle's
testimony, was the first major intellectual influence on Plato, and
Socrates, to whom Plato eventually transferred his allegiance. While
Plato resisted Cratylus' whole-hearted commitment to the ability of
names to convey the nature of their nominata, he still shared the
conviction that names can be indicators of the nature of the objects
they name. Plato's belief in the illuminatory power of names, however,
is mitigated by Socrates' demand that things be studied directly, in
their own right. The dialogue's conclusion thus reflects Plato's
philosophical maturation as a student of Socrates. In order to show
evidence of the reflexive interplay between the earlier and the later
stage of Plato's intellectual life, Sedley reexamines two highly
contested scholarly issues: the dialogue's chronology and Cratylus'
intellectual commitments.

As far as chronology is concerned, Sedley skillfully reconciles the
views of three scholarly groups: those who on the evidence of both
stylometry and philosophical argument place Cratylus near the beginning
of Plato's middle period (before Phaedo), those who consider it
decidedly a post-Republic work (serving as a prologue to such later
works as Theaetetus and Sophist), and those who deem it a late
work.[[2]] He calls Cratylus 'a possibly unique hybrid' (16) in that,
although its general ideological tenor is distinctly 'middle' --
conveyed especially by the presence of the middle-period Form theory --
some of it was rewritten late in Plato's career, possibly close to the
date of Sophist, and incorporated changes made by Plato himself in
later life. Sedley supports his settlement of the long-standing
chronology-debate by means of three considerations: (a) the occurrence
of two intrusive passages (437d10-438a2, supplied by the Vindobonensis
and considered a Platonic variant of 438a3-b4, and 385b2-d1, which
appears to be out of place) marking incoherencies between either the
immediate context of the dialogue or Plato's subsequent findings in
Sophist and suggesting, in Sedley's careful argument, that both
passages are accidental survivors from an earlier, superseded edition
of Cratylus; (b) the mention of aether in 408d, which, qua distinct
element, is of Aristotelian origin; and (c) the positing of earth as
one of the moving bodies at 397c-d, a belief which Plato came to
espouse in his old age.

Regarding Cratylus' intellectual commitments, Sedley follows Kirk in
claiming that Cratylus came to believe in some version of Heraclitean
flux for the first time in this dialogue.[[3]] It was therefore
linguistic nominalism (and Socrates' influence) that sparked his
interest in ontological instability, not vice versa. Instead of heeding
Socrates' warning against adopting a thoroughgoing Heracliteanism that
would incapacitate language, Cratylus evolved from being wedded to a
moderate version of ontological flux in our dialogue to espousing an
extreme view of this thesis later in life. Although Sedley makes a
strong case for this interpretation, I remain skeptical as to whether
the issue can be settled. Allan has already plausibly argued that
Cratylus' nominalism derived from, rather than preceded, his
ontological presuppositions, and, in any case, the fundamental paradox
of Cratylus' beliefs, namely the difficulty of reconciling any version
of flux with the fixed correctness of names, remains unresolved on any
interpretation of his evolution as a thinker.[[4]] The important issue,
and one for which Sedley argues quite persuasively, is that Cratylus'
Heraclitean affinities underpin the early, flux-ridden cosmological
etymologies of the dialogue since they suggest that cosmic fluidity is
encoded in cosmological terms. The extension of the application of the
flux thesis to the metaphysical and epistemological domains broached
later betrays the pre-Socratics' monolithic fascination with
cosmological principles, a focus which precluded a proper assessment of
the relation of real values to stable entities. By pointing out this
limitation, Plato suggests, contra Cratylus, that the study of names
cannot be the route to understanding the essence of things.

The dialogue's depiction of the transition from an early to a later
phase in Plato's philosophical evolution is most convincingly attested
by the etymologies that occupy its central part. Whereas most scholars
have dismissed the etymological enterprise as frivolous, Sedley invests
it with philosophical significance. The main thesis underlying his
analysis of this section is that the flux etymologies are 'exegetically
correct,' in that they successfully decode the unstable nature of
cosmic entities. The 'stability' etymologies (411a-421c) also share in
exegetical correctness because they reflect the early namegivers'
fleeting glimpse into the Platonic notion that knowledge and ethical
values should be informed by stability. The inability to settle the
emerging contradiction between 'being' (which pertains to
epistemological and ethical notions) and 'becoming' (attributable to
the cosmos) is emblematic of the ancients' exclusive concentration on
fluidity, and mars the 'philosophical correctness' of their
etymologies, their power to teach us philosophical truths. The long
etymological section then, far from being jocular or ornamental, is
shown to serve two important functions: it reveals that the early
nomothetai are not wholeheartedly Heraclitean in their views and that
their Cratylan affiliations are in need of philosophical modification
and implementation. The latter Plato achieved under Socrates'
intellectual guidance.

Sedley's insightful discussion bears ample evidence of his careful and
intelligent reading of the text. A good example of this appears in
Chapter Six, 'The limits of etymology.' In examining one of the stages
of naturalism, the imitative power of names made evident in the
irreducibly single phonemes (stoicheia), the author discusses the
function of the etymology of the word skle^rote^s as a limiting case of
successful imitation. Socrates' choice of this word, Sedley submits, is
instrumental in disarming Cratylus' naturalism because it contains both
the appropriate R sound (which connotes hardness) and the inappropriate
L sound (which indicates softness) in exactly equal numbers. If
therefore use of the word skle^rote^s successfully conveys the notion
of hardness, only an independent awareness of its conventional meaning
can eliminate the semantic impasse. Socrates' appeal to conventionalism
in this case, as in the rest of the dialogue, does not supplant the
heuristic value of vocal imitation but nicely complements it.

This penetrating and sustained study of Cratylus will be useful to any
serious student of Plato or of ancient Greek linguistics. The author
shows admirably well both why Plato considers the study of language to
be of relatively minor importance and why he is nevertheless convinced
of the powers of etymology. Although the reader may at times wish for a
discussion of the literary aspects of the dialogue or an examination of
the relationship between Cratylus and other dialogues that bear upon
some of the issues addressed here, the high quality of Sedley's
philosophical observations, enhanced at every step by his philological
sensibilities, far outweighs the book's occasional and at times perhaps
unavoidable omissions.[[5]]

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Notes:


1.   See, among others, T.M.S. Baxter, The Cratylus: Plato's Critique
of Naming. Leiden, 1992; A. Silverman, 'Plato's Cratylus: the naming of
nature and the nature of naming,' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
10 (1992): 25-72; C. Dalimier, Platon, Cratyle. Paris, 1998; and R.
Barney, Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus. New York and London,
2001.

2.   Among those in the first group see D. Ross, 'The Date of Plato's
Cratylus,' Revue Internationale de Philosophie 32 (1955): 187-96; J.V.
Luce, 'The Date of the Cratylus,' American Journal of Philology 85
(1964): 136-54; C.H. Kahn, 'Language and Ontology in the Cratylus,' in
E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and R.M. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and
Argument. New York, 1973: 152-76. The second group includes M. Warburg,
'Zwei Fragen zum "Kratylos" ', Neue Philologische Untersuchungen 5
(1929): ; R. Barney, Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus, New York and
London: Routledge, 2001; and G.S. Kirk: 'The Problem of Cratylus,'
American Journal of Philology 72 (1951): 225-53. For the arguments
advanced by those in the third group see G.E.L. Owen, 'The Place of
Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues,' Classical Quarterly 47 (1953): 79-95;
and M.M. Mackenzie, 'Putting the Cratylus in its place,' Classical
Quarterly 36 (1986): 124-50.

3.   G.S. Kirk, 'The problem of Cratylus,' American Journal of
Philology 72 (1951): 225-53.

4.   D.J. Allan, 'The problem of Cratylus.' American Journal of
Philology 75 (1954): 271-87.

5.   Sedley's references to Sophist, especially in the last chapter,
are rather brief and the reader could have certainly benefited from a
more detailed comparative examination of the two dialogues. The same
applies mutatis mutandis to his treatment of Theaetetus. The book is
well-edited and produced. I have noted only three typographical errors:
'spring' for 'springs' (49); '... on the Platonic understanding of
flux, it includes ...' for '... the Platonic understanding of flux
includes ...' (119); and 'Annas (1983)' for 'Annas (1982)' (125 n. 4).