31 August 2005
Today's in-depth PINR will
give readers an understanding of Iraq's constitutional process and what the
current conflicts over that constitution are. It also highlights what the likely
political outcomes will be now that the constitution has been drafted.
Additionally, PINR's services are expanding once
again. In addition to our in-depth analyses and our Intelligence Briefs, PINR
will now be adding Economic Briefs.
The Economic Brief analyzes conflicts over strategic
markets and products, the power relationships behind multilateral deals and
agreements, instances of economic nationalism and its effects on corporate
competition and geopolitics, and competition among currencies and its
geopolitical significance. Other economic subjects that relate to these subject
areas may also be covered in the Economic Brief.
Once again, at this time PINR offers this content
free to all of our
readers.
------------------------------
The Implications of Iraq's Proposed Constitution
Drafted By: Adam Wolfe
http://www.pinr.com
On
August 15, Iraq's constitutional drafting committee failed to meet its deadline
to deliver a constitution to the National Assembly, which then extended the
deadline by one week. The following week, a draft constitution was submitted but
only on the condition that negotiations would continue for another three days.
This third deadline came and went without agreement. Finally, on August 27, the
final draft of the constitution was delivered to the National Assembly without
the approval of the 15 Sunni Arab committee members, and without a vote.
The failure to win the Sunni committee members' support weakens the
prospects for bringing stability to Iraq in the near term, potentially laying
the groundwork for civil war. The constitution's embrace of federalism seems to
destroy any illusions of a strong, centralized government emerging in Baghdad,
and, if approved on October 15, could lead to the further fracturing of Iraq
along sectarian lines and could strengthen the insurgency due to widespread
Sunni Arab rejection.
Any intensification of the insurgency would affect
negatively the interests of the United States. Domestic pressure is growing for
the Bush administration to begin a limited withdrawal of troops from the
conflict; U.S. forces are overextended, which limits Washington's capability to
threaten intervention effectively elsewhere. An intensification of the
insurgency will make it difficult for the United States to pull its troops out
of Iraq since Baghdad's current security forces are not capable of adequately
handling the ongoing guerrilla campaign.
What the Constitution Means
for Iraq's Future
Many issues proved highly contentious during the
constitutional negotiations, but most were resolved by August 25. According to
Article Two of the proposed constitution, Islam will be "a basic source" for the
law -- a compromise between religious Shi'a Arabs who wanted Islam to be the
fundamental source of law and secular-minded Iraqis who would have preferred a
more diminished role for religion. This compromise will also allow clerics to
sit on the country's Supreme Court, but not as a majority. Protections for
women's rights, religious freedom and democratic principles were added, though
it is not clear whether they will trump Islamic law when in conflict.
A
bargain of sorts was also reached on the sharing of oil revenues. Iraq's
existing oil fields sit in the northern region controlled by the Sunni Kurds and
in the Shi'a-dominated south. Sunni Arabs feared that language in the proposed
constitution would allow the Kurds and Shi'a to control the revenues generated
by the oil fields. Article 110 proposes that all revenue generated by existing
operations will be distributed fairly based on the population of each province.
However, the language is vague and stipulates that those regions neglected by
"the former regime" -- the Shi'a and Kurdish areas -- will be allowed a
disproportionate share of the revenue for an undeclared period of time. This
compromise did little to assuage Sunni Arab concerns over federalism.
Federalism became the major sticking point when pious Shi'a proposed a
system that would allow for a province to link up with other provinces to form a
federal region -- with greater autonomy from the central government -- merely
through a referendum by simple majority. It was expected that the Kurds would
maintain the autonomy of the region they control in the north, but this
provision proved indigestible to the Sunni Arabs. Some of the Shi'a negotiators
imagined that the provinces in the south, sitting on some of Iraq's major oil
fields, could link-up to form a "super" region. Their Kurdish counterparts
allowed this language to be inserted because it will strengthen their claim to
Kirkuk, which under the Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq (T.A.L.) will
likely be absorbed into their autonomous zone anyway.
The Sunni Arabs
believed that the main Shi'a negotiators were laying the groundwork to break up
Iraq along sectarian lines, leaving them with the oil-free regions. Secular
Shi'a argued that this would allow Iran to establish a toehold in southern Iraq,
as many of the region's leaders will be drawn from the forces that fought on the
Iran side of the Iraq-Iran war. The pious Shi'a and Kurdish negotiators bent
slightly on these issues, but no compromise with their Sunni Arab counterparts
was struck.
The other major point of contention for the Sunni Arab
negotiators was the de-Ba'athification policy. Article 132 calls for a
continuation of the removal of ex-Ba'ath Party members from government posts
during the transition to a new government. Sunni Arabs argue that this had no
place in the constitution since it addresses a period of time before the
constitution will come into effect. Also, an absolute majority in the Council of
Representatives is necessary to end the de-Ba'athification policy, something the
Sunni Arabs simply will never be able to deliver. This language was slightly
adjusted in response to Sunni Arab requests, but remains part of the
document.
While the national assembly did not vote on the draft
constitution, it will be put to referendum on October 15. As the second deadline
passed, Shi'a and Kurdish negotiators worked out the final details without the
input of the 15 Sunni Arab members. When presented with the final document, the
Sunnis rejected the text and forced yet another delay. Ignoring previous
statements about Iraqi sovereignty, Washington became intimately involved in the
final days of the negotiations and pushed for a compromise but also approved of
the locking out of the Sunni Arabs. U.S. President George W. Bush personally
called Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a cleric and the leader of the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (S.C.I.R.I.), to lobby for a compromise. In the
end, the constitution was delivered without Sunni Arab
approval.
Everything now depends on October 15. The U.S. has scaled back
its ambitions in Iraq and believes the constitution's approval will greatly
determine the timeline on which troops can be withdrawn. The run up to the
referendum will see an increase in sectarian rhetoric and perhaps an increase in
violence as insurgents attempt to derail the vote. It is taken for granted that
the Kurdish north and Shi'a south will cast their votes for the constitution.
What is less certain is how the center of the country will
respond.
Looking Beyond October 15
The prospects for Iraq's
future now largely rest on the Sunni Arab reaction to the constitution. Whether
or not Sunnis participate in the October 15 referendum, and whether or not their
participation has an effect on its passage, will be of extreme importance. There
are several possible scenarios that Sunni Arab participation could take, some
more probable than others. In the unlikely prospect that Sunni Arabs turn out
for the referendum in decent numbers and approve of the text, the insurgency
will lose its most potent domestic base of support; the U.S. plan to hand off
the responsibilities of containing the insurgency could then continue on its
proposed course. Though this would have little effect on the jihadist
insurgents, it could undermine the Ba'athist insurgency.
In the more
likely case that Sunni Arabs stay away from the polls in October and the
constitution gains approval without their participation, the insurgency will
likely continue unabated, as the central government will find it difficult to
project its power into regions that reject its authority. In the previous
elections, Sunni Arabs largely did not participate because of threats of
violence by jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents. While some of the Sunni Arab
groups who previously argued against participation seem to have changed course
and now advocate voting down the constitution, the insurgents' threats may
prevent any substantial uptick in Sunni turnout.
This would likely
prevent any significant Sunni Arab participation and would strengthen the trend
toward federalism based on sectarian lines that the proposed constitution
allows. A weak central government dominated by regional governments could
eventually lead to the dismantling of Iraq along sectarian lines -- a prospect
that the Sunni Arab-dominated central region, which lacks the oil fields of the
Kurdish north and Shi'a south, would violently reject.
Another likely
possibility is that Sunni Arabs will turn out for the referendum but fail to
muster the two-thirds majority in three provinces necessary to defeat the
constitution's approval. If this scenario plays out, it is highly unlikely that
the Sunni population would participate in the newly formed Iraqi state, and the
insurgency would find an expanded base of support in the Sunni rejection.
Reuters quoted a Sunni Arab delegate as saying, "If they pass the constitution,
then the rebellion will reach its peak." While Sunni Arab non-participation on
the referendum, if passed, could eventually lead to civil war, Sunni
participation that fails to alter the outcome could lead to the immediate
outbreak of such a situation.
The T.A.L. outlines the course of action if
the constitution is defeated in October. The government will be dissolved and
replaced by a new assembly to be elected no later than December 15. The new
assembly would have another year to draft a second constitution, of which the
T.A.L. does not lay out a process for passage. This option may be the best-case
scenario for bringing the Sunni population into the political process, but that
would depend on the Shi'a-Kurdish reaction. Potentially, Sunni Arab rejection of
the constitution could harden the fault lines between the Kurdish-Shi'a alliance
and the Sunni Arab leaders that they still view as oppressors. No group has been
above using violence up to this point, but, to varying degrees, they have
maintained the political tract as the main avenue to resolve their differences.
It is possible that Sunni Arab rejection will encourage Shi'a and Kurdish groups
to use force to resolve the differences, leading to civil war.
Sunni
Arabs have majorities in three provinces, but it seems unlikely that they would
be able to generate a two-thirds majority in Nineveh, where there is a large
Kurdish population. The Shi'a-Kurdish decision to send the constitution to
referendum without the support of the Sunni Arab leadership was made on the
assumption that the Sunnis will be unable to defeat the measure. The possibility
that the Baghdad province could join in opposition to the referendum seems to be
the biggest gamble to the Shi'a-Kurdish proposal. If it is defeated, the
U.S.-led coalition will need to fill in the void left by the dissolved
government if a singular Iraqi state is to be maintained, necessitating the
delay of current withdrawal plans.
No matter the outcome on October 15,
rebellious Shi'a leader Moqtada al-Sadr seems poised to reap the benefits of the
referendum. When al-Sadr's followers attempted to reopen his office in Najaf on
August 23, the Badr Corps, the armed faction of S.C.I.R.I., a rival Shi'a group,
blocked them. The violence quickly spread to several other cities, including
Baghdad, and Prime Minster Ibrahim Jaafari took to the airwaves to plead for
peace, with little effect. Only when al-Sadr ordered it did the violence come to
an end. This demonstration of power is important to note because al-Sadr,
repeatedly declared "marginalized" by U.S. officials, is emerging as a bridge
between Sunni Arab insurgents and nationalistic Shi'a in his rejections of the
trend toward federalism advanced by the proposed constitution.
Nationalist Shi'a fear that religious Shi'a, who fought on the Iran side
in the Iraq-Iran war, would dominate a southern autonomous region and find
al-Sadr's proposal of a strong centralized government attractive. Some
secular-minded Shi'a might also find themselves in an alliance-of-interests with
al-Sadr as October 15 approaches. Sunni rejectionists are aligned with him on
the issue and al-Sadr has signed most of the Sunni Association of Muslim
Scholars' declarations since January 2005.
The Sunni Arab leaders may be
able to deliver sufficient majorities in the Anbar and Salahuddin provinces to
defeat the constitution, but they will need al-Sadr's help to deliver Baghdad, a
province in itself. Even if this scenario does not play out, the referendum is
likely to find many malcontents, and al-Sadr seems poised to lead them. Whether
his leadership will be within the government or against it depends on how the
vote plays out. [See: "After Winning Concessions, Al-Sadr Tries His Hand at
Diplomacy"]
Conclusion
The future of Iraq will
largely be determined by the Sunni Arab reaction to the referendum on October
15. There are several scenarios that could quickly lead to civil war or to the
break-up of Iraq along sectarian lines. The constitution does not propose a
strong central government; it opts for a federal system instead. It is the Sunni
Arab assumption that this is designed to deprive them of their share of the
country's oil wealth. However, even if Sunni Arab concerns are addressed, a
future Iraqi state without a strong center might, in time, lead to the break-up
of its geographical integrity.
Report Drafted By:
Adam
Wolfe
