Date: August 30, 2005 9:53:32 PM PDT
Subject: US "Intelligence" Lets Most 9/11 Accomplices Go Free: Incompetence or Intent?
[A couple of suspected CIA dis-information "black ops" (planting of
evidence or destruction of evidence) are highlighted below in blue.]
... Some questions have been raised about the ability of [Able Danger qua] DIA to label or "identify" Atta as an al Qaeda operative as early as 2000. To me, it would seem logical that DIA was able to do since, after all, in 2000 Atta was living in Hamburg, Germany and having regular contacts with other known al Qaeda operatives namely Ramzi Binalshibh, Said Bahaji, Zakariya Essabar, Muhammed Zammar, Mounir Motassadeq, Abdelghani Mzoudi, and Mamoun DARKAZANLI. We know that the German government had Atta’s cell —the Hamburg cell— under surveillance and we also know that our CIA was conducting parallel surveillance during the same time period.
Information surrounding the Hamburg cell and the surveillance is documented throughout the German trials of Mzoudi and Mottasedeq — two of the al Qaeda operatives that were prosecuted for their ties to the 9/11 attacks but eventually released after the United States refused to cooperate with the German courts by sharing intelligence evidence linking the men to the 9/11 plot. (Both men are walking the streets of Germany today as free men because our government refused to share evidence linking them to the 9/11 plot — something that frustrates many of the 9/11 families since we have yet to hold one terrorist accountable for the 9/11 attacks.)
The surveillance of the Hamburg cell is also mentioned in overseas news reports from both London and Germany. One account even goes so far as to say that the CIA attempted to "flip" one of Atta’s comrades (DARKAZANLI) into being an informant for the CIA.
<<Then, why not ATTA too?>>
Clearly, by December 2000, the CIA knew at least that Atta was a person of interest, so why should it seem so hard for the agency and others in our government to understand how DIA was able to do so, too?
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1995-1998: DARKAZANLI Receives Large Sums From Saudi Intelligence Front Company
A Saudi company called the Twaik Group deposits more than $250,000 in bank accounts controlled by Mamoun DARKAZANLI, a Syrian-born businessman suspected of belonging to the Hamburg, Germany, al-Qaeda cell that Mohamed Atta is also a part of.
In 2004, the Chicago Tribune will reveal evidence that German intelligence has concluded that Twaik, a $100 million-a-year conglomerate, serves as a front for the Saudi Arabian intelligence agency. It has ties to that agency's longtime chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal.
Before 9/11, at least two of Twaik's managers are suspected by various countries' intelligence agencies of working for al-Qaeda. One Twaik employee, who is later accused of helping to finance the financing of the 2003 Bali bombing (see October 12, 2002), repeatedly flies on aircraft operated by Saudi intelligence.
In roughly the same time period, hundreds of thousands of additional dollars are deposited into DARKAZANLI's accounts from a variety of suspicious entities, including a Swiss bank owned by Middle Eastern interests with links to terrorism and a radical Berlin imam.
DARKAZANLI is later accused not just of financially helping the Hamburg 9/11 hijackers, but also of helping to choose them for al-Qaeda. [Chicago Tribune, 3/31/04; Chicago Tribune, 10/12/03]
March 1997: German Government Investigates Hamburg al-Qaeda Cell
Investigation of al-Qaeda contacts in Hamburg by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany's domestic intelligence service, begins at least by this time (Germany refuses to disclose additional details). [New York Times, 1/18/03] Telephone intercepts show that a German investigation into Mohammed Haydar Zammar is taking place this month. It is later believed that Zammar, a German of Syrian origin, is a part of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. [Los Angeles Times, 1/14/03]
He later claims he recruited Mohamed Atta and others into the cell [Washington Post, 6/19/02] Germany authorities had identified Zammar as a militant a decade earlier. [New York Times, 1/18/03] From 1995-2000, he makes frequent trips to Afghanistan. [New York Times, 1/18/03; Stern, 8/13/03] German intelligence is aware that he was personally invited to Afghanistan by bin Laden. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2/2/03] Spanish investigators later say Zammar is a longtime associate of Barakat Yarkas, the alleged boss of the al-Qaeda cell in Madrid, Spain. In 1998, Germany is given more evidence of his ties to Islamic militants, and surveillance intensifies. He is periodically trailed, and all his calls are recorded. [Stern, 8/13/03] It is not clear if or when the investigation ends, but it continues until at least September 1999. [Associated Press, 6/22/02]
December 1997-November 1998: Moroccan Man Ties Hamburg and Milan al-Qaeda Cells Together
Records indicate that would-be Ramzi Bin al-Shibh lives at the same Hamburg, Germany, address as a Moroccan named Mohamed Daki during this time. Daki will be arrested in April 2003, and admits to knowing bin al-Shibh and some others in the Hamburg cell. In April 1999 Daki obtains a visa to travel to the US, but it isn't known if he goes there. It is generally assumed by the press that the Hamburg cell keep themselves separate from other al-Qaeda cells in Europe. However, Daki is an expert document forger and a member of al-Qaeda's Milan cell.
There is considerable evidence that the Milan cell has foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot. The cell is under heavy surveillance by Italian intelligence before 9/11 (see August 12, 2000) (see January 24, 2001), but apparently the connection between the Milan and Hamburg cells through Daki is not made. German authorities interview him after 9/11, and he admits ties to bin al-Shibh, but he is let go, not investigated further, and not put on any watch lists. He will later come under investigation in Italy for recruiting fighters to combat the US in Iraq. He will finally be arrested and charged for that, and not for his 9/11 connections. [Los Angeles Times, 3/22/04; New York Times, 3/22/04]
August 1998: Germany Investigates Hamburg al-Qaeda Cell Member
A German inquiry into Mounir El Motassadeq, an alleged member of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell with Mohamed Atta, begins by this time. Although Germany will not reveal details, documents show that by August 1998, Motassadeq is under surveillance. “The trail soon [leads] to most of the main [Hamburg] participants” in 9/11. Surveillance records Motassadeq and Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who had already been identified by police as a suspected extremist, as they meet at the Hamburg home of Said Bahaji, who is also under surveillance that same year. (Bahaji will soon move into an apartment with Atta and other al-Qaeda members.) German police monitor several other meetings between Motassadeq and Zammar in the following months. [New York Times, 1/18/03] Motassadeq is later convicted in August 2002 in Germany for participation in the 9/11 attacks, but his conviction is later overturned (see March 3, 2004).
September 20, 1998: Al-Qaeda Operative Arrest in Germany Leads to New German Suspects
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, an al-Qaeda operative from the United Arab Emirates connected to the 1998 US embassy bombings, is arrested near Munich, Germany. [PBS Newshour, 9/30/98] In retrospect, it appears he was making one of many visits to the al-Qaeda cells in Germany. [Corbin, 2003, pp 147] US investigators later call him bin Laden's “right hand man.” [New York Times, 9/29/01]
However, the FBI is unwilling to brief their German counterparts on what they know about Salim and al-Qaeda, despite learning much that could have been useful as part of their investigation into the US embassy bombings.
By the end of the year, German investigators learn that Salim has a Hamburg bank account. [New York Times, 9/29/01] The cosignatory on the account is businessman Mamoun DARKAZANLI, whose home number had been programmed into Salim's cell phone. [Chicago Tribune, 11/17/02] US intelligence had first investigated DARKAZANLI in 1993, when a suspect was found with his telephone number [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] , and German authorities had begun to suspect DARKAZANLI of money laundering for Islamic militant groups in 1996.
Wadih El-Hage, a former personal secretary to bin Laden, is also arrested in the wake of the embassy bombings. El-Hage had created a number of shell companies as fronts for al-Qaeda activities, and one of these uses the address of DARKAZANLI's apartment. [Chicago Tribune, 11/17/02] DARKAZANLI's phone number and Deutsche Bank account number are also found in El-Hage's address book. [CNN, 10/16/01] The FBI also discovers that DARKAZANLI had power of attorney over a bank account of Hajer, a person on al-Qaeda's supreme council. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Based on these new connections, investigators ask a federal prosecutor for permission to open a formal investigation against DARKAZANLI. An investigation reportedly begins at the insistence of the US, though Germany has claimed the request for the investigation was rejected [Agence France-Presse, 10/28/01; New York Times, 1/18/03] German investigators also learn of a connection between Salim and Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who is already identified by police in 1997 as a suspected extremist. [Associated Press, 6/22/02; New York Times, 1/18/03]
November 1, 1998-February 2001: Atta and Other Islamic Militants Are Monitored by US and Germany in Hamburg Apartment
Mohamed Atta and al-Qaeda operatives Said Bahaji and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh move into a four bedroom apartment at 54 Marienstrasse, in Hamburg, Germany, and stay there until February 2001 (Atta is already living primarily in the US well before this time).
Investigators believe this move marks the formation of their Hamburg al-Qaeda cell [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/02; New York Times, 9/10/02] Up to six men at a time live at the apartment, including other al-Qaeda agents such as hijacker Marwan Alshehhi and cell member Zakariya Essabar. [New York Times, 9/15/01 (F)] During the 28 months Atta's name is on the apartment lease, 29 Middle Eastern or North African men register the apartment as their home address.
