Fwd: Letter from Sibel Edmonds to 9-11 Commission

Begin forwarded message:

> Letter From Sibel Edmonds to the 9/11 Commission
>
> OpEdNews.Com
>
> I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious
> intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed,  
> and which as a
> witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must assume  
> that other
> serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner  
> omitted from your
> report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and
> therefore on its conclusions and recommendations.
>
>
> August 1, 2004
>
> Thomas Kean, Chairman
> National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
> 301 7th Street, SW
> Room 5125
> Washington , DC 20407
>
> Dear Chairman Kean:
>
> It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on  
> September 11;
> during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant  
> threat of
> terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your  
> commission, the
> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,  
> was created
> by law to investigate “facts and circumstances related to the  
> terrorist
> attacks of September 11, 2001” and to “provide recommendations to  
> safeguard against
> future acts of terrorism”, and has now issued its “9/11 Commission  
> Report”.
> You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report, its
> recommendations, and implementation of these recommendations, with  
> our trust and backing,
> our tax money, our security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find  
> your report
> seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence  
> issues that I
> am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the
> commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must assume that other  
> serious issues that I
> am not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your report.  
> These
> omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore  
> on its conclusions
> and recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national  
> security, we
> are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for
> clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the  
> report. I, Sibel
> Edmonds, a concerned American Citizen, a former FBI translator, a  
> whistleblower,
> a witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a  
> witness and a
> plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General  
> investigation, and a
> witness for your own 9/11 Commission investigation, request your  
> answers to, and
> your public acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues:
>
> After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at  
> the FBI’s
> largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow  
> down, even
> stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist  
> activities so that
> the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of  
> ‘extensive
> backlog of untranslated documents’, and justify its request for  
> budget and
> staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were  
> desperately
> seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and  
> its language
> units to provide them with needed translated information, hundreds of
> translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not  
> to translate and to
> let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS-60 Minutes transcript  
> dated
> October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January- 
> February 2004). This
> issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please  
> refer to
> Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy’s letters during the summer of  
> 2002, provided
> to your investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed  
> report has
> been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice  
> Inspector General
> Report (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI  
> Translation,
> provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided  
> your
> investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue  
> and the names of
> other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape- 
> recorded 3.5
> hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on  
> February
> 11, 2004).
>
> Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since  
> this
> information has been confirmed and made available to our  
> government, the
> administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain  
> in their positions
> and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI’s Counter  
> terrorism and
> Counterintelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference  
> to this
> most serious issue, has foregone any accountability what so ever,  
> and your
> recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which  
> when left
> un-addressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue  
> is systemic and
> departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this  
> information and this
> serious issue despite the evidence and briefings you received? How  
> can budget
> increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level  
> bureaucratic
> management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer,  
> “Intelligence Czar”, in
> its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this  
> problem?
>
> Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after
> September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most  
> sensitive information
> related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau’s  
> investigation. Melek
> Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be  
> granted only after
> conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson  
> used to
> work for a semi-legit organizations that were the FBI’s targets of
> investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with  
> two individuals who were
> FBI’s targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked
> all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations  
> and the
> individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped  
> hundreds, if not
> thousands, of documents related to these targets as ‘Not  
> Pertinent.’ Melek Can
> Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these  
> documents important to
> the FBI’s investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can  
> Dickerson,
> with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took  
> hundreds of
> pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the  
> FBI to
> unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her  
> direct
> supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to  
> certain 9/11
> detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to  
> FBI management,
> Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to  
> continue the
> translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to  
> maintain her Top
> Secret clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and
> administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau  
> if this security
> breach and espionage case was investigated and made public,  
> especially after
> going through Robert Hanssen’s case (FBI spy scandal). This case  
> (Melek Can
> Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please  
> refer to Senator
> Leahy and Grassley’s letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and  
> Senator
> Grassley’s statement on CBS-60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to  
> your
> investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident  
> received major
> coverage by the press (Please refer to media background provided to  
> your
> investigators in January-February 2004). According to Director  
> Mueller, the Inspector
> General criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this  
> espionage
> report regarding Melek Can Dickerson (Please refer to DOJ-IG report  
> Re: Sibel
> Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the  
> completion of your
> report).  I provided your investigators with a detailed and  
> specific account of this
> issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and
> additional documents. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours  
> testimony by Sibel
> Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
>
> Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was  
> reported to the
> FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed  
> by the United
> States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in  
> charge of
> FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain  
> in their
> positions and in charge of translation quality and translation  
> departments’
> security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of  
> investigation hastily left
> the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated
> criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these  
> criminal conducts remain
> in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising  
> Arabic language
> units of the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence  
> investigations.
> Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has foregone any
> accountability what so ever, and your recommendations have  
> refrained from addressing
> this serious information security breach and highly likely  
> espionage issue. This
> issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The  
> translation of
> our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties  
> to our
> enemies. Important ‘chit-chats’ and ‘chatters’ are being  
> intentionally blocked.
> Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these  
> serious issues
> despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget  
> increases
> address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic  
> management? How can
> the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in  
> its cocoon
> removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
>
> Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11
> terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset  
> who had been
> providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI  
> agents and a
> translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack  
> being planned by
> Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level
> intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from  
> Afghanistan . Through his
> contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin  
> Laden was
> planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting  
> 4-5 major cities,
> 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the  
> individuals in
> charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the  
> United States,
> 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months.  
> The agents
> who received this information reported it to their superior,  
> Special Agent in
> Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington  
> Field Office,
> by filing “302” forms, and the translator translated and documented  
> this
> information. No action was taken by the Special Agent in Charge,  
> and after 9/11
> the agents and the translators were told to ‘keep quiet’ regarding  
> this issue.
> The translator who was present during the session with the FBI  
> informant, Mr.
> Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in  
> writing, and
> later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press  
> reported this
> incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21,  
> 2004 stated
> that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received  
> in April
> 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director  
> Mueller that
> he (Mueller) was surprised that the Commission never raised this  
> particular
> issue with him during the hearing (Please refer to Chicago Tribune  
> article,
> dated July 21, 2004). Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your  
> investigators on
> February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, location,  
> witness
> names, and the contact information for that particular Iranian  
> asset and the two
> special agents who received the information (Please refer to the  
> tape-recorded
> testimony provided to your investigators during a 2.5 hours  
> testimony by Mr.
> Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a  
> detailed and
> specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and  
> documents I
> had seen. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel
> Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr.  
> Sarshar also
> provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with specific  
> information
> regarding this issue (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel  
> Edmonds and FBI
> Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
>
> After almost three years since September 11, many officials still  
> refuse to
> admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists’  
> plans to attack
> the United States . The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the  
> 9/11
> attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their  
> possible link to
> terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior  
> to the
> terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific  
> information
> regarding the ‘use of airplanes’, ‘major US cities as targets’, and  
> ‘Osama Bin
> Laden issuing the order.’ Coleen Rowley likewise reported that  
> specific
> information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went  
> to the same place:
> FBI Headquarters in Washington , DC , and the FBI Washington Field  
> Office, in
> Washington DC . Yet, your report claims that not having a central  
> place where
> all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our
> intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the  
> information regarding the
> Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed  
> opportunities?
> Why was this significant incident not mentioned; despite the public
> confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators,  
> and briefings you
> received directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by  
> refraining from
> asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse  
> during your
> hearing (Please remember that you ran out of questions during your  
> hearings
> with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a  
> ‘time limit’
>  excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these  
> problems and
> failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at FBI  
> Headquarters?
> How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence  
> Czar”, in its
> cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this  
> problem?
>
> Over two years ago, and after two ‘unclassified’ sessions with FBI
> officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director  
> Mueller, Attorney
> General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the  
> existence of
> unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive
> intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen,  
> a Turkish translator,
> had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he  
> had
> failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not  
> understand or
> speak even elementary level English. He had failed English  
> proficiency tests
> and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still,  
> Kevin
> Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator  
> candidates, but
> because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language  
> proficiency exam
> administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI  
> Washington Field
> Office knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task of  
> translating the most
> sensitive terrorist related information, and he was sent to  
> Guantanamo Bay to
> translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic  
> language detainees
> (Turkish, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.). The FBI was supposed to be trying  
> to obtain
> information regarding possible future attack plans from these  
> detainees, and
> yet, the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and  
> translate
> this information. Further, these detainees were either released or  
> detained or
> prosecuted based on information received and translated by unqualified
> translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and  
> Senator Leahy
> publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen’s case (Please refer to Senate  
> letters and
> documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004).  
> CBS-60 Minutes
> showed Kevin’s picture and stated his name as one of the  
> unqualified translators
> sent to Guantanamo Bay , and as a case confirmed by the FBI (Please  
> refer to
> CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your investigators).  
> Department of
> Justice Inspector General had a detailed account of these problems  
> (Please refer to
> DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to  
> you prior to
> the completion of your report).  I provided your investigators with a
> detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other  
> witnesses willing
> to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours  
> testimony by
> Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
>
> After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen’s case was publicly  
> confirmed,
> and after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes broadcasted  
> Taskesen’s case,
> Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish and  
> Turkic language
> translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting  
> that Kevin
> Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating  
> sensitive
> intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI  
> still keeps him in
> charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those  
> individuals in
> the FBI’s hiring department and those who facilitated the hiring of  
> unqualified
> translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments  
> and
> remain in their positions.  Yet, your report does not mention this  
> case, or these
> chronic problems within the FBI translation departments, and within  
> the FBI’s
> hiring and screening departments. The issue of accountability for  
> those
> responsible for these practices that endangers our national  
> security is not brought
> up even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is  
> systemic and
> departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this  
> information and these
> serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How  
> can budget
> increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of  
> ineptitude and
> incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the  
> addition of a new
> bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed from  
> the action
> lines, address and resolve this problem?
>
> In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11  
> attack, an
> agent from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain  
> document to the
> FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated.  
> This Special
> Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed  
> that,
> considering his target of investigation (the suspect under  
> surveillance), and the
> issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain  
> information
> that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist  
> activities.
> After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office  
> and
> retranslated verbatim, the field agent’s hunch appeared to be  
> correct. The new
> translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints,  
> pictures, and
> building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also  
> revealed certain
> illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the  
> Middle East ,
> through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re- 
> translation was
> completed and the new significant information was revealed, the  
> unit supervisor
> in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali,  
> decided NOT to
> send the re-translated information to the Special Agent who had  
> requested it.
> Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating  
> that the
> translation was reviewed and that the original translation was  
> accurate. This
> supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt  
> the original
> translator and would cause problems for the FBI language  
> department. The FBI
> agent requesting the retranslation never received the accurate  
> translation of
> that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and  
> specific
> account of this issue, the name and date of this particular  
> investigation, and the
> names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to
> tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to  
> your investigators on
> February 11, 2004). This information was also provided to the  
> Department of
> Justice Inspector General (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel  
> Edmonds and
> FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your  
> report).
>
> Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11; while  
> many
> agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and  
> information, and to
> investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible  
> connections to
> the attack, and those who might be planning possible future  
> attacks; the
> bureaucratic administrators in the FBI’s largest and most important  
> translation unit
> were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and
> information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations.  
> The supervisor involved
> in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important  
> Middle
> Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a  
> record of
> previous misconducts. After this supervisor’s several severe  
> misconducts were
> reported to the FBI’s higher-level management, after his conducts  
> were reported
> to the Inspector General’s Office, to the United States Congress,  
> and to the
> 9/11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBI’s Arabic  
> language unit under
> his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in  
> the FBI
> Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit  
> receiving those
> chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet  
> your report contains
> zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to  
> our failure
> in preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no
> references to individuals responsible for hindering past and  
> current investigations,
> or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives  
> for their
> career advancement and security. This issue, as with others, is  
> systemic and
> departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude this  
> information and these
> serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings you received?  
> Why does
> your report adamantly refrain from assigning any accountability to any
> individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can  
> budget increases
> address and resolve these intentional acts committed by self- 
> serving career
> civil servants? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer,  
> “Intelligence
> Czar”, in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and  
> resolve this
> problem?
>
> The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing
> information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between  
> intelligence
> agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional  
> blocking of
> intelligence, and has not been told that certain information,  
> despite its direct
> links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not  
> given to or
> shared with Counterterrorism units, their investigations, and  
> countering
> terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to 9/11, and  
> remains in effect
> after 9/11. If Counterintelligence receives information that  
> contains money
> laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities,  
> directly linked to
> terrorist activities; and if that information involves certain  
> nations, certain
> semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or  
> political relations
> in this country, then, that information is not shared with  
> Counterterrorism,
> regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain cases,  
> frustrated
> FBI agents cited ‘direct pressure by the State Department,’ and in  
> other cases
> ‘sensitive diplomatic relations’ is cited. The Department of Justice
> Inspector General received detailed and specific information and  
> evidence regarding
> this issue (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
> Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your  
> report). I provided your
> investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue,  
> the names of
> other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of  
> certain U.S.
> officials involved in these transactions and activities. (Please  
> refer to
> tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to  
> your investigators on
> February 11, 2004).
>
> After almost three years the American people still do not know that  
> thousands
> of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of  
> ‘protecting certain
> foreign business relations.’ The victims family members still do  
> not realize
> that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over  
> two years
> has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised  
> under ‘
> safeguarding certain diplomatic relations.’ Your report did not  
> even attempt to
> address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not  
> placed under
> any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding these  
> unspoken and
> unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and  
> understanding
> of certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related
> activities, committed by certain U.S. officials and high-level  
> government employees,
> you have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct,  
> although
> under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can  
> budget
> increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are  
> caused by unspoken
> practices and unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer, “
> Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed from the action lines,  
> override these
> unwritten policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our  
> national security?
>
>
> I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation  
> cannot be
> brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems.  
> Translation
> units are the frontline in gathering, translating, and disseminating
> intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack  
> may, and probably will,
> come in the form of a message or document in foreign language that  
> will have to
> be translated. That message may be given to the translation unit  
> headed and
> supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops,
> translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his  
> department, who has
> participated in certain criminal activities and security breaches,  
> and who has
> been engaged in covering up failures and criminal conducts within the
> department, so it may never be translated in time if ever. That  
> message may go to Kevin
> Taskesen, or another unqualified translator; so it may never be  
> translated
> correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer  
> within the
> language department; so it may never be translated fully, if at  
> all. That message
> may come to the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who  
> works as
> a translator in the FBI translation department, who may choose to  
> block it; so
> it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could  
> have been
> prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell  
> family
> members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could  
> have been done?
> There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.
>
> I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within  
> the FBI’s
> translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11  
> terrorist attacks,
> in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases  
> within the
> Bureau’s language units, and in light of what has already been  
> established as
> facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and problems  
> cited in
> this letter are by NO means based upon personal opinion or un-verified
> allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents  
> were found confirmed by
> a Senior Republican Senator, Charles Grassley, and a Senior  
> Democrat Senator,
> Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct  
> knowledge of
> the Department of Justice Inspector General’s report on my  
> allegations, ‘none
> of my allegations were disproved.’ As you are fully aware, even FBI  
> officials ‘
> confirmed all my allegations and denied none’ during their  
> unclassified
> meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago.  
> However, neither your
> commission’s hearings, nor your commission’s five hundred sixty  
> seven-page
> report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues,  
> major incidents,
> and systemic problems. Your report’s coverage of FBI translation  
> problems
> consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25).  Yet, your  
> commission is
> geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily  
> implement
> your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and  
> deficient
> report.
>
> In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In  
> order to
> correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into  
> account all
> visible symptoms. Your Commission’s investigations, hearings, and  
> report have
> chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing  
> ‘visible’, because
> these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the  
> intelligence
> community and have been written about in the press. I am  
> emphasizing ‘visible’
> because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this  
> letter have been
> confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your  
> commission
> chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true  
> symptoms of our
> failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed  
> these severe
> symptoms, and chose not to include them in its five hundred and sixty
> seven-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre  
> 9/11, without a
> comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our  
> intelligence
> system, without assigning any accountability what so ever, and  
> therefore, without a
> sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert
> attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through  
> hasty and costly
> measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined expensive  
> porcelain cap over
> a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first treating  
> the root,
> and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.
>
>
> Respectfully,
>
> Sibel D. Edmonds
>
> CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
> CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
> CC: House Government Reform Committee
> CC: Family Steering Committee
> CC: Press
>
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> <DIV><STRONG><FONT size=5><FONT size=4>Letter From Sibel Edmonds to  
> the 9/11 Commission</FONT>&nbsp; </FONT></STRONG></DIV>
> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
> <DIV>OpEdNews.Com</DIV>
> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
> <DIV>I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address  
> serious intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been  
> confirmed, and which as a witness to the commission, I made you  
> aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious issues that I am  
> not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your report.  
> These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and  
> therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. </DIV>
> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
> <DIV> <BR>August 1, 2004 <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Thomas Kean, Chairman  
> <BR>National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States  
> <BR>301 7th Street, SW <BR>Room 5125 <BR>Washington , DC 20407  
> <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Dear Chairman Kean: <BR>&nbsp; <BR>It has been  
> almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11;  
> during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant  
> threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily  
> lives. Your commission, the National Commission on Terrorist  
> Attacks upon the United States, was created by law to investigate  
> “facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of  
> September 11, 2001” and to “provide recommendations to safeguard  
> against future acts of terrorism”, and has now issued its “9/11  
> Commission Report”. You are now asking us to pledge our support for  
> this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these  
> recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our  
> security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report  
> seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence  
> issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as  
> a witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must  
> assume that other serious issues that I am not aware of were in the  
> same manner omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on  
> the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and  
> recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national  
> security, we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered  
> questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored  
> and/or omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned  
> American Citizen, a former FBI translator, a whistleblower, a  
> witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a witness  
> and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General  
> investigation, and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission  
> investigation, request your answers to, and your public  
> acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues: <BR>&nbsp;  
> <BR>After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators  
> at the FBI’s largest and most important translation unit, were told  
> to slow down, even stop, translation of critical information  
> related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the  
> United States Congress with a record of ‘extensive backlog of  
> untranslated documents’, and justify its request for budget and  
> staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were  
> desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on  
> FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed  
> translated information, hundreds of translators were being told by  
> their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the  
> work pile up (please refer to the CBS-60 Minutes transcript dated  
> October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January- 
> February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate  
> Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator Grassley and Senator  
> Leahy’s letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your  
> investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed report has  
> been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice  
> Inspector General Report (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel  
> Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the  
> completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a  
> detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other  
> witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape- 
> recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your  
> investigators on February 11, 2004). <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Today, almost  
> three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this  
> information has been confirmed and made available to our  
> government, the administrators in charge of language departments of  
> the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information  
> front lines of the FBI’s Counter terrorism and Counterintelligence  
> efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this most serious  
> issue, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and your  
> recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which  
> when left un-addressed will have even more serious consequences.  
> This issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose  
> to exclude this information and this serious issue despite the  
> evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases  
> address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic  
> management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer,  
> “Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed from the action lines,  
> address and resolve this problem? <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Melek Can  
> Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after  
> September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most  
> sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the  
> Bureau’s investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret  
> Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough  
> background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a  
> semi-legit organizations that were the FBI’s targets of  
> investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with  
> two individuals who were FBI’s targets of investigation. For months  
> Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to  
> these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her  
> husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of  
> documents related to these targets as ‘Not Pertinent.’ Melek Can  
> Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these  
> documents important to the FBI’s investigations and our fight  
> against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her  
> direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top- 
> secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown  
> recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct  
> supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to  
> certain 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed  
> and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to  
> remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive  
> intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret  
> clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and  
> administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau  
> if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and  
> made public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen’s case  
> (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by  
> the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator Leahy and  
> Grassley’s letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator  
> Grassley’s statement on CBS-60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to  
> your investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson  
> incident received major coverage by the press (Please refer to  
> media background provided to your investigators in January-February  
> 2004). According to Director Mueller, the Inspector General  
> criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage  
> report regarding Melek Can Dickerson (Please refer to DOJ-IG report  
> Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the  
> completion of your report).&nbsp; I provided your investigators  
> with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of  
> other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional  
> documents. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by  
> Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11,  
> 2004). <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Today, more than two years since the  
> Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years  
> since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress  
> and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI  
> personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in  
> their positions and in charge of translation quality and  
> translation departments’ security. Melek Can Dickerson and several  
> FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in  
> 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated criminally. Not  
> only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts  
> remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to  
> supervising Arabic language units of the FBI’s Counterterrorism and  
> Counterintelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these  
> significant incidents, has foregone any accountability what so  
> ever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this  
> serious information security breach and highly likely espionage  
> issue. This issue needs to be investigated and criminally  
> prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted  
> to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important ‘chit- 
> chats’ and ‘chatters’ are being intentionally blocked.&nbsp; Why  
> did your report choose to exclude this information and these  
> serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How  
> can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid- 
> level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new  
> bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed from  
> the action lines, address and resolve this problem? <BR>&nbsp;  
> <BR>Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the  
> September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI  
> informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information  
> since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific  
> information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama Bin  
> Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level  
> intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from  
> Afghanistan . Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received  
> information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist  
> attack in the United States targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the  
> attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals  
> in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the  
> United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a  
> few months. The agents who received this information reported it to  
> their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas  
> Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing “302” forms,  
> and the translator translated and documented this information. No  
> action was taken by the Special Agent in Charge, and after 9/11 the  
> agents and the translators were told to ‘keep quiet’ regarding this  
> issue. The translator who was present during the session with the  
> FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to  
> Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice  
> Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and in fact  
> the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004 stated that FBI  
> officials had confirmed that this information was received in April  
> 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director  
> Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the Commission never  
> raised this particular issue with him during the hearing (Please  
> refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr. Sarshar  
> reported this issue to your investigators on February 12, 2004, and  
> provided them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the  
> contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two  
> special agents who received the information (Please refer to the  
> tape-recorded testimony provided to your investigators during a 2.5  
> hours testimony by Mr. Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided  
> your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this  
> issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen.  
> (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel  
> Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr.  
> Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General  
> with specific information regarding this issue (Please refer to DOJ- 
> IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you  
> prior to the completion of your report). <BR>&nbsp; <BR>After  
> almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse  
> to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists’  
> plans to attack the United States . The Phoenix Memo, received  
> months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of  
> pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities  
> against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist  
> attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific  
> information regarding the ‘use of airplanes’, ‘major US cities as  
> targets’, and ‘Osama Bin Laden issuing the order.’ Coleen Rowley  
> likewise reported that specific information had been provided to  
> FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI  
> Headquarters in Washington , DC , and the FBI Washington Field  
> Office, in Washington DC . Yet, your report claims that not having  
> a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as one of  
> the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report  
> choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and  
> Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was  
> this significant incident not mentioned; despite the public  
> confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators,  
> and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even  
> Director Mueller by refraining from asking him questions regarding  
> this significant incident and lapse during your hearing (Please  
> remember that you ran out of questions during your hearings with  
> Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a  
> ‘time limit’ excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve  
> these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic  
> management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new  
> bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed from  
> the action lines, address and resolve this problem? <BR>&nbsp;  
> <BR>Over two years ago, and after two ‘unclassified’ sessions with  
> FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to  
> Director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General  
> Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in  
> charge of translating high level sensitive intelligence. The FBI  
> confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator,  
> had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he  
> had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could  
> not understand or speak even elementary level English. He had  
> failed English proficiency tests and did not even score  
> sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was  
> hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator candidates,  
> but because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language  
> proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody in FBI  
> Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin.  
> Yet, Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive  
> terrorist related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to  
> translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic  
> language detainees (Turkish, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.). The FBI was  
> supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible  
> future attack plans from these detainees, and yet, the FBI  
> knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this  
> information. Further, these detainees were either released or  
> detained or prosecuted based on information received and translated  
> by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator  
> Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen’s case  
> (Please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your  
> investigators in January-February 2004). CBS-60 Minutes showed  
> Kevin’s picture and stated his name as one of the unqualified  
> translators sent to Guantanamo Bay , and as a case confirmed by the  
> FBI (Please refer to CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your  
> investigators). Department of Justice Inspector General had a  
> detailed account of these problems (Please refer to DOJ-IG report  
> Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the  
> completion of your report).&nbsp; I provided your investigators  
> with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of  
> other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape- 
> recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your  
> investigators on February 11, 2004). <BR>&nbsp; <BR>After more than  
> two years since Kevin Taskesen’s case was publicly confirmed, and  
> after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes broadcasted Taskesen’s  
> case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish and  
> Turkic language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office.  
> After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to perform  
> the task of translating sensitive intelligence and investigation of  
> terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of  
> translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals  
> in the FBI’s hiring department and those who facilitated the hiring  
> of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in  
> those departments and remain in their positions.&nbsp; Yet, your  
> report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems within  
> the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI’s hiring and  
> screening departments. The issue of accountability for those  
> responsible for these practices that endangers our national  
> security is not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as  
> with others, is systemic and departmental. Why did your report  
> choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite  
> the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases  
> address and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and  
> incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the  
> addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in its  
> cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this  
> problem? <BR>&nbsp; <BR>In October 2001, approximately one month  
> after the September 11 attack, an agent from a (city name omitted)  
> field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI Washington  
> Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This Special  
> Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed  
> that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under  
> surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation  
> might have missed certain information that could prove to be  
> valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this  
> document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and  
> retranslated verbatim, the field agent’s hunch appeared to be  
> correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding  
> blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being  
> sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities in  
> obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East , through  
> network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was  
> completed and the new significant information was revealed, the  
> unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike  
> Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the  
> Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor  
> decided to send this agent a note stating that the translation was  
> reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This  
> supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt  
> the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI  
> language department. The FBI agent requesting the retranslation  
> never received the accurate translation of that document. I  
> provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of  
> this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and  
> the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please  
> refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds,  
> provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). This  
> information was also provided to the Department of Justice  
> Inspector General (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds  
> and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of  
> your report). <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Only one month after the catastrophic  
> events of September 11; while many agents were working around the  
> clock to obtain leads and information, and to investigate those  
> responsible for the attacks, those with possible connections to the  
> attack, and those who might be planning possible future attacks;  
> the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI’s largest and most  
> important translation unit were covering up their past failures,  
> blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going  
> terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident,  
> Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important Middle Eastern  
> languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record  
> of previous misconducts. After this supervisor’s several severe  
> misconducts were reported to the FBI’s higher-level management,  
> after his conducts were reported to the Inspector General’s Office,  
> to the United States Congress, and to the 9/11 Commission, he was  
> promoted to include the FBI’s Arabic language unit under his  
> supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the  
> FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit  
> receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat system is  
> based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding  
> these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing  
> the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references  
> to individuals responsible for hindering past and current  
> investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security  
> and our lives for their career advancement and security. This  
> issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your  
> report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues  
> despite all the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your  
> report adamantly refrain from assigning any accountability to any  
> individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can  
> budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts  
> committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the  
> addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in its  
> cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this  
> problem? <BR>&nbsp; <BR>The latest buzz topic regarding  
> intelligence is the problem of sharing information/intelligence  
> within intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies. To  
> this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of  
> intelligence, and has not been told that certain information,  
> despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related  
> activities, is not given to or shared with Counterterrorism units,  
> their investigations, and countering terrorism related activities.  
> This was the case prior to 9/11, and remains in effect after 9/11.  
> If Counterintelligence receives information that contains money  
> laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities,  
> directly linked to terrorist activities; and if that information  
> involves certain nations, certain semi-legit organizations, and  
> ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country,  
> then, that information is not shared with Counterterrorism,  
> regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain cases,  
> frustrated FBI agents cited ‘direct pressure by the State  
> Department,’ and in other cases ‘sensitive diplomatic relations’ is  
> cited. The Department of Justice Inspector General received  
> detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue  
> (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI  
> Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your  
> report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific  
> account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to  
> corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved  
> in these transactions and activities. (Please refer to tape- 
> recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your  
> investigators on February 11, 2004). <BR>&nbsp; <BR>After almost  
> three years the American people still do not know that thousands of  
> lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of ‘protecting  
> certain foreign business relations.’ The victims family members  
> still do not realize that information and answers they have sought  
> relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the  
> unspoken decisions made and disguised under ‘safeguarding certain  
> diplomatic relations.’ Your report did not even attempt to address  
> these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed  
> under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding  
> these unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your  
> full awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct that  
> connects to certain terrorist related activities, committed by  
> certain U.S. officials and high-level government employees, you  
> have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct,  
> although under the laws of this country you are required to do so.  
> How can budget increases address and resolve these problems, when  
> some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten  
> policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in  
> its cocoon removed from the action lines, override these unwritten  
> policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our national  
> security? <BR>&nbsp; <BR>&nbsp; <BR>I know for a fact that problems  
> regarding intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as minor  
> problems among many significant problems. Translation units are the  
> frontline in gathering, translating, and disseminating  
> intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack  
> may, and probably will, come in the form of a message or document  
> in foreign language that will have to be translated. That message  
> may be given to the translation unit headed and supervised by  
> someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops, translations  
> for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department,  
> who has participated in certain criminal activities and security  
> breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up failures and  
> criminal conducts within the department, so it may never be  
> translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen,  
> or another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated  
> correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer  
> within the language department; so it may never be translated  
> fully, if at all. That message may come to the attention of an  
> agent of a foreign organization who works as a translator in the  
> FBI translation department, who may choose to block it; so it may  
> never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have  
> been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will  
> tell family members of the new terrorist attack victims that  
> nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we  
> did not know, because we do know. <BR>&nbsp; <BR>I am writing this  
> letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI’s  
> translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11  
> terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain  
> problems and cases within the Bureau’s language units, and in light  
> of what has already been established as facts. As you are fully  
> aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in this letter are  
> by NO means based upon personal opinion or un-verified allegations.  
> As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found  
> confirmed by a Senior Republican Senator, Charles Grassley, and a  
> Senior Democrat Senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to  
> officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice  
> Inspector General’s report on my allegations, ‘none of my  
> allegations were disproved.’ As you are fully aware, even FBI  
> officials ‘confirmed all my allegations and denied none’ during  
> their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over  
> two years ago. However, neither your commission’s hearings, nor  
> your commission’s five hundred sixty seven-page report, nor your  
> recommendations include these serious issues, major incidents, and  
> systemic problems. Your report’s coverage of FBI translation  
> problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote  
> #25).&nbsp; Yet, your commission is geared to start aggressively  
> pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and  
> recommendations based upon your incomplete and deficient report.  
> <BR>&nbsp; <BR>In order to cure a problem, one must have an  
> accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one  
> must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your  
> Commission’s investigations, hearings, and report have chosen not  
> to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing ‘visible’,  
> because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from  
> the intelligence community and have been written about in the  
> press. I am emphasizing ‘visible’ because the few specific symptoms  
> I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly  
> acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to  
> ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our  
> failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed  
> these severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its five  
> hundred and sixty seven-page report. Now, without a complete list  
> of our failures pre 9/11, without a comprehensive examination of  
> true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without  
> assigning any accountability what so ever, and therefore, without a  
> sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to  
> divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure  
> through hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a  
> gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with  
> a rotten root, without first treating the root, and without first  
> cleaning/shaving the infected tooth. <BR>&nbsp; <BR>&nbsp;  
> <BR>Respectfully, <BR>&nbsp; <BR>Sibel D. Edmonds&nbsp;&nbsp;  
> <BR>&nbsp; <BR>CC: Senate Judiciary Committee <BR>CC: Senate  
> Intelligence Committee <BR>CC: House Government Reform Committee  
> <BR>CC: Family Steering Committee <BR>CC: Press </DIV></BODY></HTML>
>
> -------------------------------1125413567--
>



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