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Re: [VOTE] Release httpd-2.4.36


It's up to the RM on whether or not to release... one can't veto a release and a -1 is not a veto.

> On Oct 15, 2018, at 10:07 AM, Stefan Eissing <stefan.eissing@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> Am 15.10.2018 um 15:58 schrieb Jim Jagielski <jim@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>> 
>> Considering all this, I am changing my vote from a +1 to a -1. I was not able to trigger this error, but this shows, at least IMO, that TLS 1.3 support isn't quite yet tested enough to warrant a public release, unless we are super clear that it is "experimental" or "early access"...
> 
> I do not see it this black/white way. 
> 
> We have found no regression with any SSL != OpenSSL 1.1.1. 
> We have not even found a bug with TLSv1.3 as such. What we have found is a behaviour change in OpenSSL where our code relied on either changed or not well documented behaviour. 
> 
> We do not want to ship a version of httpd which has severe interop problems with the released openssl 1.1.1. 
> HOWEVER: it is unclear, if this will not also trigger in some scenario when one links 2.4.35 with OpenSSL 1.1.1.
> 
> I am all in favor of pushing a 2.4.37 immediately after this bug is fixed. We will not solve any remaining problems by letting it stew in the repository. 
> 
> -Stefan
> 
>> 
>>> On Oct 15, 2018, at 4:06 AM, Stefan Eissing <stefan.eissing@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Am 14.10.2018 um 23:46 schrieb Daniel Ruggeri <druggeri@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>>>> 
>>>> Hi, Helmut;
>>>> Note that the vote may run longer than 72 hours as 72 is the minimum. As it stands now, we have more than 3 binding +1 votes, but I am waiting for closure on the conversation on-list about the tests with reported H2/TLS 1.3 failures. Since this is one of the primary features of this release, I want to be sure the topic gets due attention.
>>> 
>>> See my mail on the other thread. It seems that h2 traffic triggers a call sequence that exposes a change in OpenSSL behaviour of SSL_read() between 1.1.0 and 1.1.1. It looks as if mod_ssl interpreted the return codes of SSL_read() in a way that no longer works and that we need to change mod_ssl handling here.
>>> 
>>> Waiting on confirmation  or rebuttal of my analysis on the other thread.
>>> 
>>> Cheers,
>>> 
>>> Stefan
>>> 
>>>> -- 
>>>> Daniel Ruggeri
>>>> 
>>>> On October 14, 2018 4:44:04 PM CDT, "Helmut K. C. Tessarek" <tessarek@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> On 2018-10-10 15:18, Daniel Ruggeri wrote:
>>>> Hi, all;
>>>> Please find below the proposed release tarball and signatures:
>>>> https://dist.apache.org/repos/dist/dev/httpd/
>>>> 
>>>> I would like to call a VOTE over the next few days to release this
>>>> candidate tarball as 2.4.36:
>>>> [ ] +1: It's not just good, it's good enough!
>>>> [ ] +0: Let's have a talk.
>>>> [ ] -1: There's trouble in paradise. Here's what's wrong.
>>>> 
>>>> The computed digests of the tarball up for vote are:
>>>> sha1: e40e7a879b84df860215b8a80f2a535534a1c4b4 *httpd-2.4.36.tar.gz
>>>> sha256: ef788fb7c814acb2506a8b758a1a3f91f368f97bd4e6db16e98001f468e8e288
>>>> *httpd-2.4.36.tar.gz
>>>> 
>>>> 72h have passed, so what is the outcome of the vote?
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>